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Life Forms: A Keyword Entry
In a 2007 report jointly issued by the United States National
Research Council’s Committee on the Limits of Organic Life in Planetary
Systems and Committee on the Origins and Evolution of Life, biologists
interested in the possibility of life on other planets speculate that living sys-
tems might employ ammonia, sulfuric acid, or methane as a solvent in the
way life on Earth uses water.1 Perhaps just as remarkable as the project of
chemical conjecture delivered by this report, however, is the document’s
opening inscription: Dedicated to Non-Human-Like Life Forms, Wherever They
Are.2 Leaving aside the authors’ probable intention that “non-human-like”
should rather read “unknown” or “extraterrestrial,” what captures our atten-
tion in this address is its most workaday term: life forms. How did life come to
have a form? More modestly and narrowly: where did the term life form
come from? And what has life form come to mean in the contemporary
moment, when it is possible to use the term to refer to as-yet conjectural
manifestations, manifestations that may redefine the very referent of life
itself?
In The Life of Forms in Art, art historian Henri Focillon writes, “Form is
surrounded by a certain aura: although it is our most strict definition of space,
it also suggests to us the existence of other forms.”3 Inspired by Focillon, we
ask: how does the concept of life form operate to suggest the existence of other
life forms? We argue that life form has, since its earliest nineteenth-century
enunciations, pointed to a space of possibility within which life might take
shape. Exactly how that space is understood and theorized has transformed
as the term has traveled into the present. We suggest that life form has moved
from its origins as a term referring to abstract, idealized, aesthetic possibili-
ties through reference to biogeographic and evolutionary possibilities to,
today, conjectural and future possibilities.
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and then abductive reasoning. We begin with deductive reasoning, the drawing of
conclusions from known principles (for example, when, as with German
Romantic biologists, plant and animal forms were imagined to be deducible
from archetypical aesthetic patterns present in nature, neo-Platonically con-
ceived). Next we consider inductive reasoning, which unfolds by inference
from particulars toward general conclusions (for example, when, as with
Darwin, descriptions of organic variation were leveraged into hypotheses
about the shaping of that variation by such forces as natural selection). And
last we discuss abductive reasoning, which derives from premises that may or
may not materialize in the future (for example, when, as with astrobiologists,
life is posited as a coherent conceptual category even in advance of discover-
ing all possible cases). Semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce described abduc-
tion as “a method of forming a general prediction without any positive
assurance that it will succeed either in the special case or usually, its justifica-
tion being that it is the only possible hope of regulating our future conduct
rationally.”4 In its abductive articulation, life form has come to be a future-ori-
ented, even hopeful, term—a term that in some instances underwrites a con-
structive approach to vitality (for example, when, as with today’s synthetic
biologists, “life” becomes a conceptual category that may be explored
through its de novo construction in the laboratory).
Capacious Doctrines: 
Warranting a Keyword Approach
The approach we take to mapping this historical transformation is
inspired by Raymond Williams’s 1976 Keywords, in which Williams offers histo-
ries of key words in social theory, detailing the shifting, contested meanings of
such terms as culture, nature, and ideology. Williams described his enterprise as:
an inquiry into a vocabulary. . . . Every word which I have included has at some
time, in the course of some argument, virtually forced itself on my attention
because the problems of its meanings seemed to me inextricably bound up with the
problems it was being used to discuss.5
We intend, following Williams, this keyword entry to be an examination of
one term—life form—that has forced itself on our attentions in the course of
our inquiries into the social and epistemological practices of the contempo-
rary biosciences.6 Our account cannot be exhaustive, nor can it fully attend to
protohistories of life form, following, for example, how life and form circulated
independently of one another prior to their amalgamation in nineteenth-
century German as Lebensform.7 As Williams suggests, “Any account is bound
to be incomplete, in a serious sense, just as it is bound to be selective.”8
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Williams’s project is his conviction that language serves as a crucible in
which ideas take shape: in words, “meanings are offered, felt for, tested, con-
firmed, qualified, changed.”9 Intellectual historians and literary critics such
as Quentin Skinner and William Empson have taken issue with two aspects
of Williams’s method: his yoking of concepts to words and his implication
that language might not only express concepts but also shape them.10 Even
so, Skinner admits that “the surest sign that a group or society has entered
into the self-conscious possession of a new concept is that a corresponding
vocabulary will be developed, a vocabulary which can then be used to pick
out and discuss the concept with consistency.”11 Our aim is to use life form,
the term, as an index through which to gauge what “life,” the concept, has
meant at different moments. We submit, following Williams, that changes in
the manner in which life form is used may signal, even propel, conceptual
changes.12
We also take as a model Evelyn Fox Keller and Elisabeth Lloyd’s 1992 Key-
words in Evolutionary Biology, which undertakes a similar project to Williams’s for
terms such as adaptation, natural selection, and fitness. Keller and Lloyd catalog the
utility of the keyword approach to historians and philosophers of science. Key-
words, for them, serve as:
indicators of patterns of scientific meaning and of changes over time in the ways
that particular scientific meanings have been structured. Attending to the multiple
meanings of key terms provides a lens through which it is possible not only to
understand better what is at issue in particular scientific debates but also to scruti-
nize the very structure of the arguments under debate. Such a lens enables an
exploration of the historically evolving field of meanings from which these argu-
ments draw and on which they depend.13
In line with Keller and Lloyd’s take on key terms in science, we hold that
the “multiple meanings” of life form are fundamental to its prevalence in the
life sciences: the term’s elasticity, its capacity to gesture toward senses and
doctrines beyond itself, allows it to operate as a frame through which bio-
logical thinking can be worked out. If, as William Empson explains, a key-
word is a “compacted doctrine,” a form that compresses multiple, often
divergent, meanings, then life form may be considered to embody a “capa-
cious doctrine,” a term with a constitutive incompleteness, ready for use in
working out fresh problems.14 If, as Alan Durant has argued in his 2006
defense of Williams’s approach, the word keyword in the age of Google often
summons up the sense of a “search” word, life form interestingly turns out to
function as just that kind of scouting operator.15
We have selected our sources to draw attention to the curious history of a
term that, while now so unassuming as to be the rhetorical equivalent of wall-
paper, overlooked and unquestioned, bears the residues of previous glosses.
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attempt to unearth how a concept undergoes multiple recalibrations and
repurposings within shifting epistemological frames. Life form transforms as
it is articulated in the registers of natural history and evolutionary biology
and, most recently, in dialogue with fields such as computer science and
engineering. Rather than functioning as an easy answer to a conceptual
problem, or set of problems, posed by different schools and eras of biologi-
cal thinking, life form has, over the last two centuries, helped articulate new
problems in biology, which have been addressed deductively, inductively,
and abductively.
Our keyword entry for life form (and its cousin, life-form) begins with the
Oxford English Dictionary, which provides the following for life-form:
1. Biol. A habit or vegetative form exhibited by any particular plant or which char-
acterizes a group of plants.
and
2. A living creature; any kind of living thing.16
The “vegetative form” to which the first OED definition refers is, in a rider
to that entry, explicated with reference to the 1903 classificatory work of the
Danish botanist Christen Raunkiær: “Various life-form classifications have
been proposed. That of C. Raunkiær (or a modification of his system)
based upon the position of the buds relative to the soil surface during the
unfavourable season is the one generally employed.” This classification sys-
tem, aimed at sorting out plants, offers as examples of life-forms such types
as therophtyes (seed-bearing annuals) and hydrophytes (aquatic plants, like
water-lilies). Form here follows from the habits of the plant (that is, its man-
ner of growth and appearance). But form also immediately points to mat-
ters of classification and representation. These two notions of form—as
emergent with embodiment and as a tool of classification—coil around each
other in nineteenth-century discussions about how an organism’s morphol-
ogy might be affected by its surrounding environment and about how this
might in turn guide possible classificatory schemes. This dual sense of form,
as we will see, shapes deductive, inductive, and abductive approaches to the
question of how life takes form.
The OED’s second definition points toward particular instances or embod-
iments of life but also signals the capaciousness of the concept of life-form as
such; in “any kind of living thing,” the emphasis is on any.
But we must dig deeper into etymology, biology, and the history of natu-
ral history to track lineages to do with representation and classification as well
as with the relation of organismic form to environment.17 Life-form enters
English from the German Lebensform, referring, according to the OED’s first
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no means coincide with natural families or groups of species.” From whence
did this meaning arrive?
Lebensformen: 
The Deduction of Living Form
According to the Deutsches Wörterbuch of Jakob and Wilhelm
Grimm, Lebensform appears in German in 1838 in the Jenaer Literatur-Zeitung:
LEBENSFORM, f.: die physische beschaffenheit der weltkörper und die auf densel-
ben möglichen lebensformen. Jenaer litt.-zeitung 1838, no. 179 s. 468 (“the physical
properties of heavenly bodies and the life forms possible upon them”).
This extract suggests that physical circumstances might delimit the space in
which life forms manifest.18 A quite different framing of Lebensform appears in
German physiologist Karl Friedrich Burdach’s Die Physiologie als Erfahrungswis-
senschaft (Physiology as a Science of Practical Experience), from 1826 to 1840,
in which Burdach writes, “The occurrence of new life forms is therefore not
external, but is determined by inner life forces and grounded in life itself [Das
Erscheinen neuer Lebensformen ist demnach kein äußerliches Hinzutreten,
sondern von innen her bestimmt und im Leben selbst begründet].”19 Where
the 1838 Jenaer Literatur-Zeitung quotation situates life forms in external physi-
cal conditions, Burdach’s phrasing posits life forms as self-organizing accord-
ing to an inner principle.20 Burdach sought to render visible this principle by
training his students at the Anatomical Institute in Königsberg in Goethe’s
disciplined perception and morphology such that “living forms and their
interconnections become evident in his [the student’s] soul.”21 Such vitalism,
which first appeared around 1790, was one current in the German biology of
the Romantic period.22
According to Timothy Lenoir, German materialist vitalism—a vitalism that
saw life as sited in a material world, even as such vitality could not be collapsed
into sheer mechanism—was also tuned to aesthetic considerations, leaning
strongly on Immanuel Kant’s conception of form.23 Kant’s 1790 theory of aes-
thetic judgment understood the pleasure taken in observing a living thing to
stem in part from imagining a purposiveness in its form.24 Johannes Müller
(1801–1858), a physiologist and anatomist whose students included Hermann
Ludwig Ferdinand von Helmholtz, Ernst Haeckel, and Louis Agassiz, used
Lebensform in the title of a piece dated from 1834 to 1840, “Schlussbemerkun-
gen über die Entwickelungsvariationen der tierischen and menschlichen
Lebensformen auf der Erde” (Concluding Remarks on the Variations of
Development in Animal and Human Life Forms on Earth), and Lenoir writes
that “we learn from Helmholtz’s correspondence that in order to understand
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ing Kant.”25 Müller’s conception of Lebensform was, to borrow Lenoir’s coinage,
“teleo-mechanist,” characterized by a conviction that biological systems
behaved mechanically and could be subjected to analytic tools developed in
chemistry and physics, even as teleological principles might still be applied
effectively where mechanistic accounts failed. Within this Kantian formula-
tion, Lebensform was something that informed itself. Evelyn Fox Keller describes
the Kantian organism as “a bounded body capable not only of self-regulation,
self-steering, but also, and perhaps most important, of self-formation and self-
generation; it is both an organized and a self-organizing being.”26
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s morphology, inspired by and in dialogue
with Kant, was an allied inspiration for German natural scientists, and was ani-
mated by a demand to use disciplined perception, at once empirical and aes-
thetic, to uncover the laws behind pure forms—what Goethe called Urformen.
Such disciplined perception would permit a view of plant and animal forms
as “derivations from an ideal type.”27 Goethe sought, argues Joan Steigerwald,
to arrive at “objective knowledge of nature by discerning the ideal archetypes
giving necessity to the transformation of form.”28 His colleague and some-
time competitor Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller put front and cen-
ter the deductive ethos that might motivate such an approach, arguing for a
practice in which one would “start from abstract a priori principles, and
deduce laws that are then to be demonstrated in the particular.”29
Lebensform thus bears an inheritance from Kant and Goethe (though this
exact word was used by neither) in which form is aesthetic, self-determining,
and teleological, as well as (generously assuming sufficient knowledge of the
mechanism of its formation) deductively predictable (even if the favored
apprehensional approach was often a combination of the intuitive and
empirical). For many thinkers, the address from which such form was ulti-
mately derived was left open; it might be in some numinous world soul or
latent in Newtonian nature.30 This open-endedness, as we will see, remains a
defining quality of life form, contributing to its continuing theoretical persua-
siveness and semantic potency.
The focus on the aesthetics of life comes in the nineteenth century into
tension with attention to how Lebensformen might emerge from organisms’
habits and habitation. Lebensform appeared in an 1836 article by anatomist
Theodor Bischoff in the Archiv fur Anatomie, Physiologie, und Wissenschaftliche
Medicin, a journal edited by Müller. In this article, which concerns the struc-
ture of crocodile hearts, Bischoff wrote: “This strange imperfection of hema-
topoiesis [blood formation], which in the class of amphibians is caused by
forms of blood circulation, must have a direct relation to their whole life
form [Lebensform], and is probably related a great deal to their habitation in
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detail.”31 Lebensform does double duty in this quotation: it refers to amphib-
ianness as a general category, but it also points toward the relation of an
organism to its environment.
That relation—of habit, habitation, and medium to the poiesis of the
organism—becomes important in refinements of Lebensform, in which form is
not simply a manifestation of an aesthetic impulse, but takes shape with respect
to material circumstances. The central figure here is naturalist Alexander von
Humboldt.
Alexander von Humboldt was influenced by the scholarship of his older
brother, Wilhelm, a philosopher close to Goethe and Schiller. Wilhelm von
Humboldt’s articulation of Lebensform, in a historical philology lecture at the
Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin in 1824, had it as synonymous with cus-
tom: “Yet the common parlance includes (admittedly in one life form less
than another) the whole population, and what has influenced one part, will
be acquired collaterally by all [Denn die gemeinschaftliche Rede umschlingt
doch (freilich in einer Lebensform weniger als in der andern) das ganze
Volk, und was auf sie bei Einzelnen gewirkt ist, geht doch mittelbar auf Alle
über].”32 Lebensform was here used in a sense best translated as “form of life”
or “way of life” (that is, custom or culture).33
Alexander von Humboldt generalized notions of Lebensform as custom or
habit to the organic world. For him, humans and other animals were influ-
enced by their physical environments in a fashion similar to plants: “A sav-
age’s state is primarily modified by the Nature of the climate and soil he
inhabits. It is these modifications alone that distinguish the first inhabitants
of Greece from shepherd Bedouins, and from Canadian Indians.”34 For
plants, as historian Robert Richards writes, Humboldt “regarded the differ-
ent species and subspecies of plants as playing variations on . . . constant
themes. The same types, he thought, would be found in similar environmen-
tal conditions (for instance, of temperature, elevation, and moisture) across
the globe.”35 At the same time, Humboldt did not abandon aesthetic com-
mitments: “The discrimination of form, according to Humboldt, is an aes-
thetic task, not a classification done according to the usual criteria of
botanical systems, such as that of Linnaeus. Rather, we must be guided by the
painterly eye, which highlights the distribution of leaves, the forms of stems
and branches.”36 Humboldt brought into play the habitual, environmental
conditioning of form, pulling aesthetic abstractions down to earth, begin-
ning a shift from deductive to inductive thinking about life forms. Such a
hybrid definition of form shapes his 1805 “Essay on the Geography of
Plants”: “It is in the absolute beauty of forms, in harmony and contrast, that
the assemblages are created of what we call the ‘natural character’ of this or
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1845, directly imports the word Lebensform into an accounting of the nonhu-
man world; he writes of “die microscopischen Lebensformen des Südpol
Meeres” (the microscopic life-forms of the Antarctic seas).38 Humboldt influ-
enced the thinking of Charles Darwin, who read Humboldt on his voyage on
the Beagle and took to heart Humboldt’s conception of the environmental
shaping of form.
Ernst Haeckel in 1866 and 1868 used Lebensform in a broad biological
sense, while maintaining Wilhelm von Humboldt’s use of the term to refer
to custom, in Generelle Morphologie der Organismen (General Morphology of
Organisms) and Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte (The History of Creation):
“This differentiation or separation, this continually increasing divergence of
the human character and human life form expresses itself by the ever more
pronounced and ongoing division of labor for individuals [Diese Differen-
zirung oder Sonderung, diese stetig zunehmende Divergenz des men-
schlichen Charakters und der menschlichen Lebensform wird hervorgebracht
durch die immer weiter gehende und tiefer greifende Arbeitstheilung der
Individuen].”39 In Morphologie, considered Haeckel’s theoretical masterpiece,
he wrote: “All life forms, even the highest and most complex among them, can
arise only by this means—through gradual differentiation and transmuta-
tions of the simplest and lowest forms of existence.”40 These texts were
hugely popular—Schöpfungsgeschichte went through twelve German editions
and by World War I had exposed more readers to Darwinian theory than
had Darwin’s own books.41 Lebensform also shows up in Haeckel’s 1899 Die
Welträthsel (The Riddle of the Universe), though it always appears as “einzel-
lige Lebensform” (single-celled life-form).42 “Forms of life” appears in a
1904 English adaptation of Haeckel’s text, entitled The Wonders of Life.43
Haeckel, a student of Müller, was an admirer of Goethe’s aesthetic theory of
morphology, but he fused it with a Darwinian commitment to the notion of
natural selection as the sculptor of form—indeed, Haeckel dedicated the
second volume of Generelle Morphologie to Darwin, Goethe, and Jean-Baptiste
Lamarck, the “three founders of descent theory.”44 Haeckel faulted Darwin,
however, for focusing overmuch on inorganic environmental determinants
of form and for attending insufficiently to the ways living things shaped
one another: “In order to comprehend truly the tremendous importance
that the struggle for existence possesses for the formation of the entire
organic nature . . . one must not conceptually extract the particular life-
forms and merely observe them. . . . Rather one must compare these life-
forms in their collective entirety.”45 Insofar as Haeckel retained something
of Goethe’s intuition about archetypes, he sited those archetypes not in an
ideal world, but in the past. His dictum that “ontogeny recapitulates phy-
logeny” located archetypes in a kind of evolutionary memory.46 Haeckel’s
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suggest a secondary meaning of form referring to the precision and geomet-
rical discipline he discerned in the organisms he illustrated.47
Life-Forms: 
The Induction of Living Form
During the mid-nineteenth century, life form became increasingly
common in English. The earliest published instance of life form we have been
able to find appeared in 1844 in the New Age, Concordium Gazette, and Temper-
ance Advocate, where it was used not in the context of biology, but to refer to
studies of animal magnetism: “The Magnetist looks to the scriptures for con-
firmation for all that he advances when he says that the Deity is working
three organizations—the physical organism, the intellectual organism, and
the Divine organism; and again, when he declares that the physical Life form
has its senses, the Light intellectual form has its clairvoyance, and the Divine
Love form its conscientious sensibility.”48 However, life forms does not enter
common parlance for two more decades, after which it begins to be used reg-
ularly in journals such as the American Naturalist, where the word appeared
in at least eleven separate articles between 1878 and 1898. An early use of life
form in English comes in 1869 in the Anthropological Review: “But geology
bears unflinching witness to the fact, that the progression of life forms has
not taken place by consecutive steps of ascent.”49 Indeed, there are many
appearances of life form or life-form prior to the OED’s 1899 mention. In these
instances, life form almost always is embedded in an account of descent with
modification. Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selec-
tion is the overwhelming frame of reference.50
Allied terms circulated during Victorian arguments over the nature of
geological and biological change prior to the publication of Darwin’s On the
Origin of Species, in which participants debated the merits of uniformitarian-
ism, catastrophism, and transformism. In such discussions, forms of life refer-
enced extant and extinct organic forms, pointing toward as-yet undiscovered
fossilized forms of life and (in early examples of abductive biological think-
ing) even future or imagined organisms.51 Though Victorian thinkers did not
use life forms, forms of life was common, and it suggests a similar conceptual
niche in which life references its own limits.52 The capaciousness of forms of
life served especially well those arguing for the possible limitless plenitude of
living things, and for those speculating on processes that generated biologi-
cal forms and their transmutations. In his Vestiges of the Natural History of Cre-
ation, Robert Chambers in 1844 uses “forms of life” and “organic forms” to
speak to the diversity of biological matter, both in current and earlier eras:
“These facts clearly show how all the various organic forms of our world are
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all, collecting them, from the humblest lichen up to the highest mammifer,
in one system.”53 Geologist Adam Sedgwick, who was one of the most force-
ful detractors of Vestiges, countered that the hypothesis “that the animal king-
dom, including both the extinct and living forms of life, might be arranged
in some preconceived order of natural development” was “but a physical
romance, and a work of imagination” lacking any “base in true induction.”54
Between the publication of Chambers’s Vestiges and Darwin’s Origin raged
the “plurality of worlds” debate over the possibility of intelligent extraterres-
trial life. Both sides of the argument deployed “forms of life” in reasoning
about the limits of biology—and reached opposite conclusions. William
Whewell, a liberal Anglican and prominent Victorian scholar best known for
coining the term “scientist” in 1833, maintained that life did not exist on
other planets; he considered his position both a scientific and a moral one.
A vocal proponent of Baconian induction, Whewell believed that gleaning
general principles from particulars was a means of discerning how God’s
laws governed nature. Belief in extraterrestrial life, Whewell contended,
required that “[we] reject the laws which govern the known forms of life, in
order that we may be able to maintain the possibility of some unknown form
in a different planet.”55 To illustrate the dubiousness of suspending the laws
discovered to determine known terrestrial biological adaptations, he fabulated
conscious vaporous creatures populating the surface of Saturn (an abductive
move that, as we will see, will be just fine with astrobiologists reasoning from
as-yet unknown but possible cases).
Scottish evangelical David Brewster argued acrimoniously against Whewell,
in favor of biological plenitude. For him, the diversity of life on Earth, and the
voluminousness of space, pointed to the existence of intelligent life elsewhere.56
He suggested that the application of comparative anatomist Richard Owen’s
theory of vertebrate archetypes to “the possible forms of life in other planets
possesses a more general interest, and forms an entirely new, and we think, irre-
sistible argument for a plurality of worlds.”57 The following year, a Unitarian
divine elbowed his way into the debate in a series of lectures titled Astro-Theol-
ogy, in which he speculated: “While the grand analogy is unbroken, inasmuch
as gravitation, light and heat act by universal laws, the intensity varying in a
known ratio to distance; that varied distance itself changes the result so greatly,
as to forbid us to adhere too closely to the definite forms of life with which we
are familiar on this Earth, in our reverent attempt to people those distant
orbs.”58 In such arguments, the conceptual elasticity of “forms of life” allowed
Chambers, Whewell, and Brewster to designate the conceptual category of life
even as their referents outpaced themselves. In the twentieth century, life forms
would again be tuned to the fantastic and fanciful morphologies creatures
might obtain on worlds other than this one.
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enough to state that it is almost universally believed by those competent to
give an opinion, that all life forms have come into being by a process of evo-
lution from primitive organic germs.”59 Morgan was a student of T. H. Hux-
ley, who also had a fondness for the term life-form, which appears several
times in his essays. In his “Address of the President of the Geological Society”
in 1870, Huxley mentions “our knowledge of paleozoic rocks and the life-
forms which they contain.”60 It is notable that Huxley was fluent in German,
having translated German vital materialist Karl Ernst von Baer into English.
How did Lebensform make it into English as life-form or life form? It is pos-
sible that Louis Agassiz, who worked with Müller and wrote in German,
English, French, and Latin, may have imported Lebensform as life-form to the
United States or at least popularized it there. Agassiz, whose scientific
approach was influenced by the Naturphilosophie in which he had trained,
moved to the United States in 1846, after having studied in Germany and
France with Müller, Humboldt, and Georges Cuvier. Alpheus Packard, Agas-
siz’s student and fellow scientist at the Museum of Comparative Zoology at
Harvard University, used life-forms in 1885: “There is a strange commingling
of life-forms in the Straits of Belle Isle,” and also in 1888 (albeit then un-
hyphenated), arguing against the theory of natural selection: “This point is
one which the writer has also made . . . holding that it is an important objec-
tion to the theory of natural selection, the very nature of which involves the
existence of a world already stocked with life forms.”61 Writing about Agassiz
in The American Naturalist (a journal Packard edited) at the close of the nine-
teenth century, Packard describes Agassiz’s theory of “embryonic,” “synthetic,”
and “prophetic” types of organisms, twice using life-forms to describe his men-
tor’s work.62 In Agassiz’s Contributions to the Natural History of the United States of
America, life-form does not appear, but is nonetheless implied: “The combina-
tion, in many extinct types, of characters which, in later ages, appear discon-
nected in different types, exhibits thought, prophetic thought, foresight;
combinations of thought preceding their manifestation in living forms.”63
This is exactly the position against which Darwin argued; life forms were not
expressions of an abstract archetype and certainly not emergent from an
internal teleological force; rather, any such archetype as there might be was
a material ancestor. Robert Richards writes, “The generalized archetype of
the vertebrates did not lie hidden away as an idea in the mind of God; rather,
it was the form of a creature that walked the earth many generations ago.”64
Darwin argued inductively (though speculatively), from data he and others
collected, that a process of descent with modification could be inferred as the
force giving form to organisms—form that was transmitted down generations.
In Origin, Darwin writes of the “general succession in the forms of life.”65 At
the end of the first edition of Origin, though, he writes that, “probably all the
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some one primordial form, into which life was first breathed,” a phrasing
that permits readers to imagine material form as separate from a life force.66
The reader will have noticed that English life form appears in two ways,
with and without the hyphen: life-forms and life forms. Life-form, with hyphen,
may be an attempt to preserve the word’s German origin. But life-form also,
by the opening of the twentieth century, begins to have a specific meaning in
botany (as, recall, a classification “based upon the position of the buds rela-
tive to the soil surface during the unfavourable season” [OED]). Christen
Raunkiær’s technical meaning of life-form is still in strong use in botany—and
employed a good deal in invasion biology, to fix on the adaptational repro-
ductive characteristics of invasive, or “alien,” species, keeping alive the bio-
geographic meaning pioneered by Humboldt. The OED credits Raunkiær
with bringing life-form into common usage, despite the fact that Lebensform
and life-form had been in use for about one hundred years and fifty years,
respectively, at the time that Raunkiær published Planterigets Livsformer og
deres Betydning for Geografien.67 Nonetheless, the primary botanical sense of
life-form as it is used today is associated with the ideas of Raunkiær on the
relation of plants to their environments, which he first presented in 1903 at
a meeting of the Danish Botanical Society.68 Raunkiær owed much of his the-
ory of life-forms to Alexander von Humboldt, whom he credited in the
French translation of his article for his phytogeographic theory, in which a
plant acts as “the recorder of the biological value of any climate.”69
Once imported from German into English, life-form loses, along with its
hyphen (which it consistently retains only in botany), much of the reference
to deductive reasoning that had accompanied it when deployed in teleo-mech-
anist discourse and other circles of German Romanticism. As life comes to
modify form, rather than being designated by form’s self-generation, life form
becomes the subject of Darwinian attention, and form refers to particular
arrangements and shapes of living things. And, interestingly, life form, with-
out hyphen, permits “life” and “form” to work as independent concepts.
Where, for Darwin, the forms at stake in his theory of evolution were species,
the phytogeographic life-forms of Humboldt and later of Raunkiær were
anchored in particular habits, not, as with Darwin’s species, their genealogy
or phylogeny. The “form” of life—whether apprehended as materializing in
species (durable but changeable genealogical kinds) or as sorted into types
occupying spaces of physical, metabolic, or ecological possibility (for exam-
ple, photosynthesizers, deep-sea dwellers)—thus crystallizes with respect to
different kinds of causal ontologies, different fields of possibility. Indeed, we
will show in the next section how in the twentieth century possibility is ampli-
fied to become itself an object of theory; life forms not as archetypes, but
future types.
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The Abduction of Living Form
The objects and phenomena to which the notion of the life form
refers are framed by conceptual commitments. Darwin’s theory of evolution
by natural selection, for example, offered an account of how living form
materialized out of what we would now call environmental or ecological
dynamics. In the twentieth century, a variety of attempts to expand biologi-
cal theory sought to amplify explanations of living form by locating such
accounts in the more universal territories of physics, chemistry, and mathe-
matics.70 While such forays into what came to be called “theoretical biology”
never fully reformatted the dominant, empirical, and experimental tradi-
tion of biology, they bring into relief how the form in life forms came to be
epistemologically extended into the realm of the conjectural. Theoretical
biology can help us understand the ampleness of the “any” in the OED’s sec-
ond definition of life-form, “any living thing” (and we write here of that genre of
theoretical biology in dialogue with physics, chemistry, and geometry rather
than of those versions occupied with mathematical models of population
genetics, sex ratios, or selection).71 Together with science fiction–fueled specu-
lations about life on other worlds—about which more in a moment—theo-
retical biology marks out the ways that form came unmoored from life, as the
two words, having lost their corseting hyphen, began circulating indepen-
dently of each other. Indeed, theoretical biologists rarely—if ever—mention
life forms at all, choosing instead to refer merely to form, which is often used
interchangeably with organization, morphology, and pattern. The concept
of life form has subsequently been generalized to include purely theoretical,
even fictional, instances.
Theoretical biology is generally understood to have begun with the work
of D’Arcy Thompson in On Growth and Form, from 1917. Thompson argued
that the shape of organisms was both constrained and shaped by physics, by
a mathematics or geometry of nature; embryology might learn much from
studying crystal growth patterns. The forces of natural selection and muta-
tion alone could not account for the diversity and unity of forms of living
things. Thompson wrote of “mechanical phenomena which are profoundly
associated with Life, and inseparable from our understanding of Growth and
Form” and urged that organisms be understood as objects, writing that “the
form of an object is a ‘diagram of forces.’”72 Developmental biologist John
Tyler Bonner writes that Thompson “showed that to a remarkable degree
the form of animals and plants could be described in physical and mathe-
matical terms; nature subscribed to the sound principles of engineering.”73
As Evelyn Fox Keller summarizes the matter, Thompson thought that “fami-
lies of animal forces are bound by an underlying algebraic structure.”74
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with the logic behind it—and, indeed, with what that logic might predict. He
wrote less of the empirical than about what was, in his words, “theoretically
imaginable.”75
Thompson had many successors, biologists who trained less attention on
selection and heredity and more on the manifestation of organic bodies with
respect to the physics of the world. In 1957 C. H. Waddington wrote of “epi-
genetic landscapes,” representations of the space of possibility for organis-
mic embodiment, spaces occupied and realized when genotype is translated
into phenotype. Life form, in this moment, lost its anchor in living material,
such that living form came to be interpreted as just one instantiation of form
more generally. Inquiring as to the essential mechanism driving morphogen-
esis at the 1968 symposium “Towards a Theoretical Biology” he had orga-
nized, Waddington provocatively contended that the question of form in
biology had been given undue importance “because of a confusion between
some of the numerous contexts in biology in which that very general word
‘form’ is used”: “If one could discover a ‘secret’ of form, that would have a
good claim to be one of the secrets of life, and a major one at that; whereas if
form arises by quite different processes in different instances, can it really be
so fundamental after all?”76 Form, in this moment, becomes programmatic:
it is a formalism describing the mechanisms by which biological structure
is generated, often conceived, after the rise of the genetic code, as purely
informatic. As such, form comes to be only conceptually useful as far as it is
predictive: Waddington largely dismisses form because “in all realms other
than the molecular, biological forms seem to me to originate as consequences
of biological activities, rather than being primary causes of them.”77
Between the 1970s and the 1990s, theoretical biologists of different stripes
struggled to provide a universal account of life premised on self-organized
form. Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana’s 1974 theory of “autopoiesis”
saw the key to organismic integrity and form in the dynamics of self-organiza-
tion.78 Developmental biologist Brian Goodwin, in such works as 1994’s How
the Leopard Changed Its Spots, sought to get at the question of “why life is capa-
ble of such diversity and beauty of forms while at the same time revealing an
underlying unity.”79 Reviving the spirit of Thompson, Goodwin argued that
“organisms can take any form, have any color, and eat any food, subject only
to very broad constraints that are basically due to physical and chemical
laws.”80 Goodwin maintained that organisms are “irreducible entities that
are engaged in the process of generating forms and transforming them by
means of their particular qualities of action and agency, or their causal pow-
ers.” Earlier in the book Goodwin writes, “Organisms express their natures
through the particular qualities of their form in space and time.”81 Theoreti-
cal biologist Stuart Kauffman, in The Origins of Order, wrote that scientists
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the ‘self-organized,’ or natural, forms readily constructed via known devel-
opmental mechanisms.”82 All of these writers wonder if biological theories of
form can be grounded in a more universal, less contingent process—and
whether biology might thereby become a more universal science.
The apotheosis of such a universalistic approach can be found in the
computer-simulation driven field of Artificial Life.83 Founder Chris Langton
claimed that Artificial Life is about “the attempt to abstract the logical form
of life in different material forms,” a definition that holds that formal and
material properties can be usefully partitioned, and that what matters is
form.84 Langton’s declaration that life “is a property of the organization of
matter, rather than a property of matter itself” offers an extreme Platonism
that opens up the possibility that life might manifest in any material at all,
anywhere, including cyberspace.85 Langton makes the abductive quality of
this kind of reasoning explicit when he says, “It’s very difficult to build gen-
eral theories about what life would be like anywhere in the universe and
whatever it was made out of, when all we have to study is the unique example
of life that exists here on Earth. So, what we have to do—perhaps—is the
next best thing, which is to create far simpler systems in our computers.”86
Continuing in the same vein, Langton merges abduction and construction,
claiming that “since it is quite unlikely that alien life forms will present them-
selves to us for study in the near future, our only option is to try to create
alternative life-forms ourselves.”87 Langton, trained as a physicist (and hold-
ing an undergraduate degree in anthropology), emblematizes the move in
twentieth-century biology toward attempts to create a grand theoretical
frame for biology, a frame that can be true, just as physics is supposed to be,
anywhere in the universe. It is that universalism, in which life reaches toward
forms as yet unencountered, that permits today’s astrobiologists to extend
the concept of life forms into the unknown, to seek out life forms, as the
National Research Council has it, “Wherever They Are.” It is this same open-
ended deferral of meaning that renders the concept of life forms so genera-
tive for science fiction writers.
An influential and epistemologically diagnostic genre of writing in which
the form in life form has been universalized, then, is science fiction. The Sci-
ence Fiction Citation project of the OED contains quotations going back to
1931, notably, from Amazing Stories, “I have thought of it at length. It is dis-
gusting. Compelled to traffic with an alien form of life!”88 An earlier use of
life-form in science fiction can be found in H. P. Lovecraft’s 1929 short story,
“The Dunwich Horror,” which describes the body of the “teratologically fab-
ulous” teenager, Wilbur Whateley: “It could not be vividly visualized by any-
one whose ideas of aspect and contour are too closely bound up with the
common life-forms of this planet and of the three known dimensions.”89
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uses of the term—“ideas of aspect and contour”—with notions of life as
materializing in physical spaces of possibility (“the three known dimen-
sions”). Life form in twentieth-century science fiction has since become so
commonplace as to risk cliché. The term appears multiple times in the sto-
ries of science fiction novelists Douglas Adams, Ursula K. Le Guin, and
Philip K. Dick, even making an appearance in a variant of the classic Star
Trek prologue in the film Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, summarizing the
starship Enterprise’s “ongoing mission: to explore strange new worlds, to seek
out new life forms and new civilizations.”90 Science fiction uses resonate with
that of the National Research Council that opened our essay, in which Hum-
boldtian concerns with materiality (now less about phytogeography than
about the sorts of solvents in which life might thrive) fuse with Lovecraftian
musings about aesthetic, transdimensional possibility.
Coda: 
The Construction of Living Form
The latest research on life forms is no longer simply deductive,
inductive, or abductive. Rather, it adds an element that we may describe as
constructive. Scientists in the recently chartered field of synthetic biology
seek to build biological parts that can be assembled into complex biological
devices and systems. They justify their attempt to rebuild living systems from
scratch using two arguments: that life may be made “better” through its
redesign according to engineering principles, and that life itself may be bet-
ter understood by fabricating viable systems de novo than by observing ready-
made living systems.91 The earliest use of life form we have been able to find
in connection with synthetic biology comes in 2004, the year of the first syn-
thetic biology conference, held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
That usage appears in a 2004 quotation from J. Craig Venter in Science:
“‘We’d like to be building life forms from first principles,’ says Venter, ‘but
it’s kind of hard when you don’t know all the first principles.’”92 Much of
synthetic biology is future oriented, abductively anticipating what sorts of
things could theoretically be fabricated in the near future, once first princi-
ples are known: news reports announce “Synthetic DNA on the Brink of
Yielding New Life Forms,” and bloggers declare (abductively) that “synthetic
biologists are the people who are going to build new life forms.”93 That “life”
in this field is treated as a coherent entity, despite the fact that what is at
stake is its material reconstruction, attests to the capaciousness of the con-
cept of life form to designate conjectural possibilities that nonetheless stabi-
lize present kinds.
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here? A recent issue of Representations, devoted to the question of form and
formalisms—primarily as a concern in literary analysis, cultural history, and
aesthetics—can provide a starting point. As Thomas Laqueur suggests in his
piece “Form in Ashes” in that issue, at stake in discussions of form are ques-
tions about how to approach comparison across cases and how to find com-
mensurability and calibration across realms of discourse and practice.
Formalist approaches, he argues further, have often sought to pin down iso-
morphisms: “an ‘identity’ or ‘similarity’ or ‘exact correspondence’ or ‘close
relationship’ of form between seemingly different contemporaneous or tem-
porally distant domains.” Laqueur points out that the term isomorphism
“comes from chemistry and geology,” in which “different but isomorphic
substances crystallize in the same ‘form,’ or from mathematics, where iso-
morphism describes the identity ‘of form . . . between two or more groups,’
thereby authorizing certain operations.”94 Laqueur names Max Weber’s
claim of an elective affinity between Calvinist Protestantism and capitalism as
an operation animated by—authorized by—an argument of isomorphism.
What operations are authorized by the isomorphisms assumed and set in
place by the term life form? The primary operation, of course, is generaliza-
tion—that disparate living things share form as such. More grandly, the
claim of isomorphism across diverse biological entities authorizes the
attempt to craft an encompassing theory of the biological, one that can be
employed to abduct or construct new kinds.
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